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Introduction 
 
 
More German ‘Blue Helmets’ 
Four Reasons the Federal Republic of Germany Should Show Greater Commitment 
to UN Peacekeeping 
Markus Kaim / Lena Strauß 
The German Armed Forces contribute to the United Nations Multidimensional Inte-
grated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This is the first time in more than 
20 years that Germany has deployed a strong contingent for a United Nations peace-
keeping operation, though the UN’s multilateral crisis management is currently re-
quired to operate in very different conflict contexts. The Federal Government should 
scrutinize how Germany can participate more comprehensively and more strategically 
in these missions than it has done up to now. There are a number of reasons to sustain, 
prioritize and extend this commitment which pertains to issues of strategy, personnel 
policy, training and equipment. 
 
For a long time, peacekeeping operations 
were a blank spot in German UN policy – 
at least in operational terms. In fact, there 
has not been a lack of political and finan-
cial support in Germany for such missions 
in past decades. However, its contributions 
of personnel have remained sparse. As 
shown in the following, there are four 
reasons for Germany to become more in-
volved in UN peacekeeping operations. 
In this sense, its deployment as part of 
MINUSMA could or rather should signal a 
new prioritisation for German security 
policy. 
1. The transformation of UN 
Peacekeeping Missions 
Since the mid-1990s, UN missions have 
undergone a steady transformation in 
terms of challenges and deployment envi-
ronments. As a result, the range of tasks 
expanded from simple observer missions 
and traditional peacekeeping to multi-
dimensional peace operations and peace 
enforcement missions. The deployment 
environment is often an ongoing civil war, 
involving non-state actors (e.g. rebels, ter-
rorists) and external forces (e.g. neighbour-
ing countries, transnational groups). Con-
sequently, the missions’ mandates were 
also extended to include the protection of 
civilians and the fight against other threats. 
In addition, the civilian component of the 
missions became the focus of peace efforts; 
SWP Comments 29 
July 2017 
2 
this includes disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration of ex-combatants as well 
as reform of the respective security sector. 
Furthermore, political tasks such as moni-
toring elections, creating constitutional 
institutions and economic reconstruction 
became additional tasks. Longer deploy-
ment periods further burdened the mis-
sions. For example, the UN mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo or 
MONUSCO (formerly MONUC) has been in 
place since 1999. 
In order to fulfil all these tasks and 
expectations, the UN urgently needs con-
tinuous support in terms of personnel, 
equipment and funding. To produce relief 
was also the aim of the Leaders’ Summit 
on Peacekeeping, which took place in 
New York in September 2015 and was 
initiated by US President Barack Obama. 
Representatives of more than 50 countries 
pledged to counter the lack of personnel 
and equipment in UN peacekeeping opera-
tions. A force of nearly 97,000 uniformed 
personnel, including more than 80,000 
contingent troops, 2,000 experts on mis-
sion, a little over 12,000 police officers and 
around 2,000 staff officers, is currently 
being deployed in a total of 16 UN peace-
keeping missions. 
2. The return of European 
peacekeeping 
Germany’s commitment to ongoing UN 
missions is limited. Among Member States 
of the world body, the Federal Republic is 
ranked 34th – with a total of 804 seconded 
staff, consisting of 749 contingent troops, 
18 experts on mission, 31 police officers 
and 26 staff officers (as of 30 June 2017). 
Compared to its European allies, Germany 
is somewhere in the middle of the pack. 
Italy has committed a total of 1,083 per-
sonnel (1,053 contingent troops/4 experts 
on mission/2 police officers/24 staff offi-
cers), France 804 (732/3/20/49), United 
Kingdom 700 (667/7/0/26) and Spain 658 
(617/20/6/15). 
However, something else is rather re-
markable. In many European capitals, 
UN peacekeeping operations are being 
rediscovered as an effective tool of crisis 
management. The UK and the Netherlands 
are an example of this development. After 
years of ‘abstaining’, London sent 100 
soldiers to the UN operation in South 
Sudan (UNMISS) in autumn 2016. As early 
as 2014, the Netherlands abandoned its 
policy of not participating in peacekeeping 
efforts by sending 450 soldiers to Mali. 
Although this policy field is experiencing 
a kind of renaissance, this does not neces-
sarily apply to other European partners, 
such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden. This 
is expected to have a twofold impact on 
Germany. The political pressure on the 
Federal Republic to become a leading Euro-
pean power in this area (together with 
others) will only increase. At the same time, 
growing military integration within the EU 
means that Germany, as a partner and co-
ordinator, is becoming increasingly indis-
pensable in UN peacekeeping operations. 
3. The ‘responsibility debate’ 
The ‘responsibility debate’ clearly outlines 
the extent to which German policy has 
already adjusted to these altered circum-
stances. In parallel speeches at the Munich 
Security Conference in 2014, Federal Pres-
ident Joachim Gauck, Foreign Minister 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Defence 
Minister Ursula von der Leyen called for 
Germany to take on more responsibility in 
the world, given the changed security 
policy environment. One dimension of this 
postulate was that Germany would get 
involved more actively with the UN than it 
had done to date. This was already reflected 
in efforts by Germany’s Federal Foreign 
Office at the Peacekeeping Summit in 
New York in 2015 and at the Peacekeeping 
Defence Ministerial in London in 2016. 
The Federal Government’s security policy 
White Paper from 2016 also tackles the 
issue of peacekeeping missions as a field of 
action and prioritized the UN over other 
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multilateral organizations in which Ger-
many is active with regard to security 
policy. At the European level, the European 
Global Strategy clearly outlines the EU’s 
commitment to peacekeeping and peace-
building. Brussels not only wants to better 
coordinate EU missions with UN missions 
on the ground, but also to intensify cooper-
ation with the UN in general. 
4. Candidacy for a seat on the 
Security Council 
At the same time, as its participation in 
MINUSMA, the German Federal Republic is 
applying for a non-permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council for 2019/20. To date, 
there has been a clear discrepancy between 
Germany’s political and financial support 
for UN missions and its modest contribu-
tions of personnel. This is a barrier for 
Berlin’s application. Germany will have to 
substantially expand and restructure its 
contributions to UN peacekeeping opera-
tions on several levels – politically, stra-
tegically and operationally – in order for 
its application to be taken seriously. 
The Federal Foreign Office had already 
begun to think in these terms when it 
highlighted securing peace as one of the 
four core objectives of the German applica-
tion. Contributions to UN peacekeeping 
operations are, therefore, also becoming 
proof of Germany taking on more responsi-
bility and are an important instrument 
within international security policy. 
Germany’s commitment in Mali 
Germany is currently providing a civil as 
well as military commitment to all three 
international missions deployed in Mali. 
This engagement already demonstrates 
that German foreign and security policy is 
setting a new emphasis and is now focus-
sing on UN missions. The German Armed 
Forces are providing training capacities and 
medical care for the EU Training Mission 
Mali (EUTM). Germany is represented in an 
advisory capacity at the EU Capacity Build-
ing Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Mali, the civilian 
EU mission. Its largest contribution of 
personnel – currently 639 uniformed and 
civilian staff – is to MINUSMA; the Federal 
Republic is contributing more than any 
other European country. 
German commitment in Mali is not only 
unusual because of its scope, but also be-
cause of the mixture of political motives 
that led to it. Firstly, they intended to fill 
the hole created by the departure of Dutch 
combat and transport helicopters. Sec-
ondly, Berlin wanted to support the efforts 
pursued by the French Operation Barkhane 
in the north of the country. Another incen-
tive was the threat to the civilian popula-
tion as well as to the Malian state from 
extremist groups. Germany’s commitment 
is exemplary in meeting its country and 
regional political objectives as well as its 
alliance obligations and international 
responsibility. 
Recommendations for more 
commitment and responsibility 
There is not only a need but also an op-
portunity for Germany to commit more 
strongly and comprehensively to UN peace-
keeping missions. In this context, the Fed-
eral Government must take into account 
five fields of action. 
A strategy for German commitment to UN 
peacekeeping is needed if the Federal Repub-
lic is to play a greater role in this area. This 
should reflect the following aspects: selec-
tion criteria for conflicts which German 
policy can and wants to help resolve; 
relevant measures with which Germany 
has already gained experience; required 
coordination with other actions and other 
actors. Also, the analysis capabilities of 
think tanks and other research facilities 
with regional expertise should be used 
more systematically in deployment plan-
ning and preparation than they have been 
to date. In addition, the German Armed 
Forces needs better experience manage-
ment with regard to earlier missions. 
SWP Comments 29 
July 2017 
4 
More recently, countries in the Euro-
Atlantic region have expanded their mili-
tary cooperation and/or have significantly 
advanced the integration of their armed 
forces. As a result, German contributions to 
UN peacekeeping will be part of an “inte-
grated quota” in the foreseeable future. A 
binding German UN peacekeeping strategy 
would, therefore, also send a clear signal of 
its intentions toward the EU and NATO. 
Secondly, the German Armed Forces and 
Germany’s Foreign Office should coordi-
nate and pursue a strategic personnel policy. 
Its aim must be to fill important posts for 
planning and decision-making processes in 
the UN Secretariat with German diplomats 
and officers, e.g. in the Integrated Mission 
Task Force, the Department of Peacekeep-
ing Operations and in the Office for Mili-
tary Affairs. German personnel should be 
able to make key contributions to the 
Integrated Mission Planning Process in 
order to shape UN missions. 
Thirdly, this requires targeted training of 
personnel by the German Armed Forces 
for UN deployments. To date, training to 
specifically deal with UN missions only 
constitutes a minimal part of the National 
General/Admiral Staff Officer Course 
(NGASOC). The German Armed Forces’ UN 
training centre in Hammelburg also trains 
selected or voluntary staff as military 
observers for UN missions. An integrated 
training course for German soldiers spe-
cifically designed for such missions would 
send a clear signal that the Federal Repub-
lic wants to assume leadership responsi-
bility in current and future UN missions. 
Fourthly, a permanent personnel quota 
should be defined for UN tasks with regard 
to short-term and prospective assignments. 
This applies, on the one hand, to military 
personnel (soldiers/observers). Here, the 
German Armed Forces should put forward 
more experienced personnel for operative 
posts on UN missions. It would seem sen-
sible to incorporate such UN assignments 
in personnel planning as career-advancing 
posts to the same extent as is the case with 
tasks in the EU and NATO. On the other 
hand, they also require civilian staff and 
police officers who can contribute to the 
comprehensive tasks of multidimensional 
missions. In the past, German police offi-
cers have frequently provided training 
services in various places, such as in 
Kosovo. 
Fifthly, the German Armed Forces needs 
a strategic equipment policy for its missions 
because providing appropriate equipment 
for the deployment environment signifi-
cantly increases the chances of a mission 
being successful. UN missions often have 
weaknesses in this area and particularly in 
logistics and air transportation. With a 
concept that would help develop autono-
mous as well as complementary capabili-
ties, Germany would not only be showing 
initiative with regard to equipment, but it 
would also be ensuring it could make its 
own comprehensive contribution. Particu-
lar attention should be paid to the com-
plementarity of equipment in conjunction 
with European partners in order to com-
pensate for, or avoid, bottlenecks, duplica-
tions and supply gaps. 
Such a strategy for UN peacekeeping 
would give credibility to Germany’s appli-
cation for a seat on the Security Council. 
Moreover, it would represent a policy 
instrument with which the Federal Govern-
ment could actively implement its ideas 
on international order. 
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